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• Most industrialized economies now
have an explicit inflation objective as
a key component of their monetary
policy framework.
• Although definitive guides to the
appropriate design of an inflation-
targeting framework were lacking in
the early 1990s, the frameworks have
nevertheless changed relatively little
since their inception.
• Supported by improved credibility, design
changes have tended to increase ﬂexibility
within the frameworks, allowing for a
more nuanced response to economic
shocks.
nflation targeting is about 15 years old, so there is
now much to learn from the collective experience
of the industrialized countries that have adopted
inﬂation targeting as the centrepiece of their
monetary policy. The impact of inﬂation targeting (IT)
on inﬂation and other economic variables has been
studied extensively. This article focuses on changes in
the design of IT regimes.1 Which countries, having
introduced inflation targeting at some point, subse-
quently changed the original makeup of their IT
regime, and why? Lessons from their experience can
help to identify unexpected problems and highlight
the preferred features of an IT regime.
A key issue in the design of an IT regime is how much
flexibility it allows. There is widespread agreement
that it is not possible for central banks to achieve a
speciﬁc numerical inﬂation target all—perhaps even
most—of the time. Indeed, it is not even considered
desirable. A too-rigid determination to hit the target,
even in the face of economic shocks, can generate det-
rimental volatility in both interest rates and economic
outcomes. Yet central banks want to maintain conﬁ-
dence in the IT regime, even if measured inﬂation is
off target, possibly for extended periods. This leaves
IT central banks with a significant problem: If they
both expect and condone divergences from the target—
the essence of ﬂexibility—how can they maintain the
credibility of the IT framework?
IT central banks usually resolve this tension by speci-
fying a set of components for the IT regime that go
beyond a simple numerical target.  This can include
ranges around the target (or ranges without a target),
1.   As part of the work to inform the renewal of the agreement on Canada’s
inﬂation-control target, this article focuses on what can be learned from the
experience of industrialized countries other than Canada.
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caveats for particular circumstances, varying policy
horizons, and different price indexes for the target,
all of which may be combined with various institutional
arrangements and communications initiatives. Together,
these elements form an inter-related framework that
becomes part of the monetary authority’s overall strat-
egy for communicating with the public and ﬁnancial
markets.
Striking the right balance has not been easy for many
central banks.  Nevertheless, the rising credibility of
the relatively new IT frameworks has, over time, facil-
itated their flexible application and influenced the
design choices of the authorities. This article begins
with the introduction of inﬂation targeting in industri-
alizedeconomiesandthenexamineshowcountrieshave
drawn on their own experience and the expanding liter-
ature on inﬂation targeting to change their IT frame-
works over time.
The Spread of Inﬂation Targeting
Today,inflationtargetingisabroadlyacceptedapproach
on which to base monetary policy, yet it was quite
revolutionary in the early1990s.2 At that time, dissatis-
faction with both exchange rate and money-growth
targets fuelled the search for alternatives, but the
analysis of inﬂation targeting was relatively limited.3
Indeed, little of the extensive literature on inflation
targets that is now available preceded their introduction
in the first half of the 1990s. As a result, the precise
framework adopted by early IT countries depended
heavily on the judgment developed from past experi-
ence and on the prevailing circumstances.
Today, inﬂation targeting is a broadly
accepted approach on which to base
monetary policy, yet it was quite
revolutionary in the early 1990s.
2.   Some observers have identiﬁed various antecedents to the current IT
regimes, as well as important related work in the literature (e.g., on the trade-
off between output and inﬂation and early work on the beneﬁts of low inﬂa-
tion). Nevertheless, the adoption of inﬂation targeting in the early 1990s rep-
resented a sharp, and somewhat surprising, break from previous generally
accepted practice.
3.   This is in part because the focus was on ﬁnding intermediate targets on
which monetary policy had a more direct and timely inﬂuence.
The ﬁrst wave: 1990 to 1994
A “ﬁrst wave” of inﬂation targeters adopted the then-
novel framework in the first half of the 1990s.4 As a
group, these countries had a relatively unsatisfactory
history of inﬂation (see Chart 1). The initial countries,
New Zealand and Canada, wished to facilitate disin-
ﬂation, in part by promoting a reduction in inﬂation
expectations. As low rates of inflation took hold among
the industrialized economies, the emphasis shifted to
locking in the gains and preventing a reacceleration of
inﬂation.
As New Zealand’s inﬂation rate fell in the late 1980s,
there was some uncertainty as to how far this decline
should be pursued, and concern that inﬂation expecta-
tions were stabilizing at a relatively high level (around
7 per cent).5 When, in 1988, the then-ﬁnance minister
began to ruminate publicly about desired inﬂation of
“around 0 or 0 to 1 per cent” his comments were greeted
with some surprise (Reddell 1999, 67). Despite this
somewhat ambivalent reaction, revised central bank
legislation was enacted in 1989. It was followed in
March 1990 by the first Policy Targets Agreement
(PTA) between the ﬁnance minister and the Governor-
designate of the central bank, which specified an
explicit 0 to 2 per cent inﬂation objective.
NewZealandwasfollowedbyCanadainFebruary1991,
when the Bank of Canada and the government jointly
announced the adoption of explicit targets for reducing
inflation. As the Bank had been without an explicit
framework for monetary policy since the abandonment
of monetary targeting in 1982, Governor John Crow
made the case in 1988 for lowering inﬂation towards
the longer-run objective of price stability, although
no numerical definition was given (Crow 1988; see
also Thiessen 2000 for a longer perspective). As in
New Zealand, there was a desire to lower expectations
to foster disinflation. This desire was heightened by
concern about the possible impact of a large price-
level shock stemming from the introduction of the
Goods and Services Tax at the beginning of 1991 (as
well as from the sharp rise in oil prices following the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990).
4.   We include as inﬂation targeters those industrialized countries that have
become generally identiﬁed as such in the literature, although some countries
may not define themselves thus. Discussions on the definition of an inflation-tar-
geting country abound. See, for example, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001).
5. A particularly comprehensive analysis of the beginning of inﬂation target-
ing in New Zealand, and the circumstances which led to it, can be found in
Reddell (1999). See also Sherwin (1999).7 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2006
Pressure on the exchange rate arrangements in place
within Europe, and the subsequent loss of the exchange
rate as a nominal anchor for policy, prompted several
European countries to move to inflation targeting. It was
introduced in the United Kingdom soon after that
country’sdeparturefromtheExchangeRateMechanism6
in September 1992. The new framework announced in
October by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (who
remained responsible for interest rate decisions) speci-
fied an inflation target of 1 to 4 per cent. In a similar fash-
ion,Swedenadopted inflation targeting soon after its
fixed exchange rate regime was abandoned in November
1992 (with the krona quickly declining by about 15 per
cent). In the context of a very weak economy and a falter-
ing banking system, inflation was already low, but a new
basiswasneededonwhichtoformulatemonetarypolicy.
In January 1993, the Riksbank announced that it would
focus on a 2 per cent inflation target, with a tolerance
intervalof±1percentagepoint.GovernorBäckströmlater
observed that, given the need to put the new framework
6.    The Exchange Rate Mechanism was originally established in 1979 by the
European Community to specify limits on the amount that the value of mem-
ber countries’ currencies could move against each other.
rapidly in place, “not all aspects of the new framework,
such as how monetary policy should react to various
types of shocks, could be thoroughly examined.”7
The turbulence among European currencies in the early
1990s was particularly problematic for Finland and
its strong post-war commitment to a fixed exchange rate
regime. Like Sweden, Finland faced a deepening
recession and a growing banking crisis. Persistent
pressure on the markka developed, and it was ﬂoated
in September 1992. The Bank of Finland adopted inﬂa-
tion targeting six months later, following a period of
some policy confusion, with the objective of stabilizing
inflation at 2 per cent by the end of 1995. The announce-
ment “was not well received by the public,” which
responded with skepticism, despite inﬂation already
being close to the announced target (Åkerholm and
Brunila 1995).
The adoption of an IT regime in Australia followed
a relatively informal process, leaving some uncertainty
as to its precise timing. In March 1993, the Governor
7.   See Bäckström (2003). Heikensten (2002) describes subsequent efforts to
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announced that policy would be based on price stability
as deﬁned by inﬂation of less than 2 per cent, although
money was to play an important role. The SNB did not
view its new approach as inﬂation targeting, although
Rich (2000, 21) suggests that “the differences between
the SNB’s new approach and inflation targeting involve
mainly questions of semantics.”
In Norway, attempts to maintain short-term exchange
rate stability became increasingly untenable in the
1990s, inﬂuenced, in part, by large swings in the price
of oil. Inflation concerns mounted in response to a
prolonged economic upturn, and, in March 2001, the
government introduced the Regulation on Monetary
Policy,whichindicatedthatthepolicyobjectiveshould
be price stability, with an operational inﬂation target
of approximately 2 1/2 per cent over time. The govern-
ment’s decision to adopt an IT regime was also
linked toa fundamental change in the fiscal policy
framework, which limited the scope for using pub-
lic finances to manage aggregate demand. In March
2001, inflation targeting was also introduced in
Iceland through a joint declaration by the central
bank and the government. Price stability is defined
as 2 1/2 per cent, and the central bank is required to
issue a public report if inflation deviates more than
1 1/2 per cent above or below this.
A third wave? 2006 to –
Two major industrialized countries have yet to adopt
explicit inflation targeting, or at least to define an
inflation rate consistent with price stability—the
United States and Japan. In both countries, however,
inﬂation targeting as a basis for monetary policy has
been the subject of active debate for several years.
In the United States, the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee (FOMC) discussed inflation targeting on numer-
ous occasions in the mid-1990s, spurred perhaps by
the adoption of inflation targeting among the first
wave of countries described above. More recently, the
debate has received impetus from the replacement
of Chairman Alan Greenspan by Ben Bernanke, who
is considered generally supportive of a more explicit
inﬂation target for U.S. monetary policy.
U.S. monetary policy in recent years has been widely
regarded as successful, acquiring considerable credi-
bility in the pursuit of low inflation. Some observers
are therefore skeptical about the beneﬁts to be gained
from an explicit IT regime. They suggest that the per-
ceived policy constraints imposed by a speciﬁc target
are problematic, in part because of the Fed’s legis-
lated “dual mandate” of price stability and full employ-
ment. Nevertheless, inflation targeting has received
of the central bank voiced his view that, from the
perspective of price stability, inﬂation of “an average
of 2 to 3 per cent over a period of years...would be
a good outcome” (Stevens 1999). Subsequent speeches
added progressively more detail to the framework,
including the view that the target should be assessed
“on average, over the cycle,” reﬂecting the position
that inflation was hard to control precisely. This tentative
beginning led to some difﬁculty in convincing market
participants that Australia had a meaningful target.
The original specification was “initially widely thought
to be a bit too soft” (Stevens 2003). This uncertainty
was resolved in 1996 when the agreement between the
Governor and the Treasurer was formalized by the
ﬁrst Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy (subse-
quently updated in 2003).
The Governor of the central bank of Spain announced
the adoption of an inﬂation target in November 1994,
following the implementation in June of a revised law
that had granted the central bank full autonomy, in
line with the requirements of Spain’s pending partici-
pation in the European Monetary Union (EMU). The
central bank was also at least partly motivated, as in
Canada, by concern over the possible impact of a
price-level increase arising from an increase in the
Value-Added Tax, which took effect in January 1995.
The second wave: 1999 to 2001
A “second wave” of inflation targeters began when
11 countries (including Finland and Spain, noted above)
created the EMU and, as a result, the euro zone. The
European Central Bank (ECB) began operations on
1 January 1999, with a monetary policy framework that
was already fully delineated. The ECB’s Governing
Council interpreted the legislated objective of price
stability as requiring an inﬂation rate for the euro area
of “below 2 per cent” over the medium term. Note,
however, that the ECB does not consider itself an
inflation targeter, at least not in the way countries
suchasNewZealand,theUnitedKingdom,andSweden
do. Emphasis is given to “a broadly based assessment
of the outlook for price developments,” drawing on a
range of information, together with a “second pillar”
focusing on monetary developments.
Switzerland had used monetary targeting as a nomi-
nal anchor for policy, shifting to multi-year monetary
targets in the early 1990s as a way to respond more
ﬂexibly to shocks. Problems persisted, however, and
by the late 1990s, monetary targets were no longer
considered best practice (e.g., they were not a good
vehicle for explaining policy decisions to the public).
At the end of 1999, the Swiss National Bank (SNB)9 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2006
considerable support among both academics and pol-
icy officials, who tend to view a specific target as a
means of further enhancing an already successful
framework. Supporters note that inflation targeting
as actually practised is implemented flexibly and is
consistent with output stabilization.8 Since Chairman
Bernanke’s term began in February 2006, public com-
mentary has emphasized an intermediate option, which
focuses on the announcement of a numerical deﬁni-
tion of price stability that would be relevant over the
longer term (see Meyer and Sack 2006a, 2006b, or
Gramlich 2003 for an earlier discussion).
The monetary authorities in Japan have also discussed
inﬂationtargeting onseveral occasionsinrecent years,
as revealed in the recorded minutes of their monetary
policy meetings. Substantial changes to the Bank of
Japan Act implemented in 1998 clariﬁed the objective
of price stability, but did not deﬁne it quantitatively.
Suggestions by some observers that Japan adopt an
explicit IT framework have been made in a very dif-
ferent environment than in the United States. With
persistent deﬂation over the period 1998 to 2005, inﬂa-
tion targeting was thought to be a means of returning
to a low but positive inﬂation rate.
Although the Bank of Japan adopted various monetary
policy measures in the ﬁrst half of the 2000s (Ito 2004),
it did not include explicit inﬂation targeting. In March
2006, however, an announcement of changes to the
Bank’s operating procedures was accompanied by a
statement that members of the Bank’s Board of Directors
considered price stability to be consistent with meas-
ured inflation in a range of 0 to 2 per cent over the
medium-to-long term. They emphasized that this did
not imply a policy of explicit inflation targeting, but
was simply a reference range for price stability.
Early experience with IT frameworks
As described above, the proximate cause of the shift to
inﬂation targeting has varied across countries and has
included such factors as the loss of previous nominal
anchors, the desire to lower inflation expectations
during a disinflationary period, concern over the impact
of increases to indirect taxes, monetary union in Europe,
and ﬁscal reforms. The collapse of ﬁxed exchange rate
regimes has in some cases led to a particularly rapid
shift in the policy framework. Nevertheless, underly-
ing most countries’ shift was a growing consensus on
the desirability of low inﬂation. Inﬂation targeting has
8. Many supporters argue that an IT regime actually promotes output stabili-
zation by reducing uncertainty and allowing the monetary authorities to act
more aggressively to stabilize output, owing to gains in credibility.
also spread to an expanding group of emerging-market
economies, despite earlier fears that it would be too
difﬁcult for these countries to successfully implement
an IT regime (see box).
The frameworks might therefore have
been expected to undergo extensive
revision as experience was gained and
the relevant literature expanded.
Numerous analyses have examined outcomes for
inﬂation under IT regimes in the industrialized econo-
mies, and for other variables, such as inflation expecta-
tions and volatility in output and policy instruments
(for relevant surveys, see Kuttner 2004; Mishkin and
Schmidt-Hebbel 2001; and Roger and Stone 2005). In
general, two broad results emerge. First, inﬂation tar-
geters have successfully achieved and maintained low
inﬂation, but it is difﬁcult to discriminate between the
outcomes of IT and non-IT regimes. Indeed, the 1990s
saw a general shift to low inﬂation, with an evident
convergence in inflation rates across countries (Chart 2).
Second, inflation expectations appear to be well
anchored in both IT and non-IT countries, but there
is evidence that the impact of economic shocks on
Chart 2



















1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Note: Unweighted average of Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,








price index (%)10 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2006
inflation expectations is lower in IT countries (see
Gürkaynak, Levin, and Swanson 2006; and Levin,
Natalucci, and Piger 2004).
Overall, countries have been far more successful in
minimizing the deviations of outcomes from targets
than might have been expected, based on earlier expe-
rience. Yet inflation targeting remains a reasonably
new policy regime, one that Kenneth Kuttner (2004)
describes as “still very much in its adolescence.” The
frameworks might therefore have been expected to
undergo extensive revision as experience was gained
and the relevant literature expanded. In the next sec-
tion, we discuss how the various components of the
IT frameworks have evolved.
Components of the IT Framework
Inﬂation targeting is one way to help the public and
ﬁnancial markets understand the central bank’s objec-
tives and actions. In response to criticism that this
regime may lead to a narrow emphasis on controlling
inﬂation over short time horizons, all IT central banks
stress that they implement the targets with some
degree of ﬂexibility—a necessary response to uncer-
taintyaboutthefuturebehaviourofeconomicvariables
Inﬂation Targeting in Emerging-Market Economies
Despite the serious inﬂation problems in the devel-
oping world, or perhaps because of them, inﬂation
targetingwas initially consideredinappropriate for
emerging-market economies. Implementing an
IT framework was perceived as a daunting task,
requiring, among other things, a level of policy
expertise, smoothly functioning markets, and insti-
tutional infrastructure that did not appear to exist
in most of these economies. Other monetary regimes,
such as an exchange rate peg, were suggested as
more suitable. Over time, however, the emerging
economies have come to be seen as the largest
potential beneﬁciaries of inﬂation targeting, which
would provide them with the clear nominal anchor
and, ultimately, the policy credibility they lacked.
Following the successful disinflation achieved
within the developing world during the mid-1990s
(see Chart B1), inﬂation targeting was also viewed
as a way of “locking in” the hard-won progress.
Between 1997 and early 2002, at least 13 emerging-
market economies (including Israel, the Czech
Republic, Poland, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, South
Africa, Thailand, Korea, Mexico, Hungary, Peru,
and the Philippines) adopted an explicit IT regime.1
In 2005–06, at least four other economies also
moved to inﬂation targeting (the Slovak Republic,
Indonesia, Romania, and Turkey).
Although explicit inﬂation targeting was adopted
recently among the emerging economies, it is
possible to assess its impact, given the large pool
of non-IT emerging economies that can be used
for comparison (this is very difficult among the
industrialized countries, since only a few of them
do not have an inﬂation target or a deﬁnition of
price stability). A recent study by the International
1. We adopt the classiﬁcation of developing countries with IT regimes as
deﬁned in IMF (2006).
Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, compared
macroeconomic performance among the first
13 emerging-market economies identiﬁed above
against 29 comparable non-IT emerging-market
countries (IMF 2006). It ﬁnds evidence that macro-
economic performance in the economies with
inflation targeting has been superior to that in
countries which use other monetary policy regimes.
While further analysis is necessary to conﬁrm these
results, they suggest that inflation targeting can
indeed be successfully applied among a broader
group of countries than earlier believed.
Chart B1
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and, in particular, shocks to the economy. This reﬂects
the fact that inflation targeting is not simply about
controlling inﬂation, but is ultimately about achieving
good outcomes in the economy.
In some cases, economic shocks may pose relatively
little difficulty for the monetary authorities, such as
demand shocks that push prices and output in the
same direction. Here, stabilizing the price level would
also work to stabilize output at its potential (although
an important consideration is how quickly to achieve
this). However, the problems that can be associated
with a narrowly implemented IT regime (one that
rigidly adheres to a numerical target over a short
period) are more apparent in the face of cost-push
shocks, or supply shocks, which can shift output and
inﬂation in opposite directions. In such cases, there is
a risk of responding to a one-time shift in the price
level as opposed to a trend inﬂationary disturbance. In
a narrowly implemented IT regime, where the central
bank focuses on returning inﬂation to the target level
as soon as possible, the shock to output may be exac-
erbated. Another type of shock, which some analysts
suggest that central banks (both IT and non-IT) should
explicitly incorporate into their policy response, is
asset-price misalignments.9 Some proponents of
placing a stronger emphasis on asset prices argue that
they can be accommodated within the traditional IT
framework by lengthening the policy horizon over
which inﬂation is returned to the target.
The challenge of dealing with shocks in an IT regime
is further complicated by uncertainty over the nature
of the shock itself, since “shocks do not come with
labels” (Trichet 2004, 4). Thus, the overall design of the
various elements of the framework, and their inter-
relationships, becomes critical. For example, combining
a relatively short policy horizon with a narrow target
9.  For a discussion of this issue, see Selody and Wilkins (2004).
Date adopted March 1990 February 1991 October 1992 January 1993 March 1993
Current target 1–3 per cent range 2 per cent midpoint 2 per cent (±1 per 2 per cent, ± 1 per 2–3 per cent on
(no speciﬁed midpoint) in 1–3 per cent range cent, but not a target cent average over the
range) business cycle
Target variable CPI (with caveats CPI (operationally CPI (based on the CPI (but UND1X CPI
for some deviations) use core CPI) European Union often emphasized)
harmonized index)
Policy horizona Medium term 6–8 quarters Medium term 2 years Medium term
Target set by PTA (most recently Government and Remit from Chancellor Central bank Joint statement (most
in 2002) between central bank (5-year of the Exchequer (at recently in 2003) by
RBNZ Governor and agreement, last set least every 12 months) the Governor of the
Minister of Finance in 2001) Reserve Bank and
the Treasurer
Finlandb Spainb Euro zonec Switzerlandc Norwayd
Date adopted February 1993 November 1994 January 1999 January 2000 March 2001
Current target 2 per cent Close to 2 per cent Below, but close to, Less than 2 per cent Approximately
2 per cent 2 1/2 per cent
(± 1 per cent, but
not a target range)
Target variable Adjusted CPI CPI HICP CPI CPI (emphasize a
core measure of
the CPI)
Policy horizon Date-speciﬁc Date-speciﬁc Medium term 2–3 years 1–3 years
Target set by Central bank Central bank Central bank Central bank Government
Table 1
Current Inﬂation-Targeting Frameworks
New Zealand Canada United Kingdom Sweden Australia
Note: CPI = consumer price index, PTA = Policy Targets Agreement, UND1X = measure of underlying inﬂation, HICP = harmonized index of consumer prices
RBNZ = Reserve Bank of New Zealand
a. The policy horizon may represent different things within an IT regime. Here it indicates the time period that is most commonly emphasized by the central bank.
b. In January 1999, both Finland and Spain became members of the euro zone.
c. The European Central Bank and Swiss National Bank do not consider inﬂation targeting the goal of their monetary policy regimes.
d. Iceland introduced inﬂation targeting at the same time as Norway, with the same numerical inﬂation target.12 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2006
range to minimize divergences from the target in the
face of shocks could lead to instability in policy instru-
ments and induce undesired ﬂuctuations in output.
Dealing with shocks in an IT regime
is further complicated by uncertainty
over the nature of the shock itself.
These concerns must be accommodated, however, in a
way that does not seriously compromise the credibility
of the regime by creating doubts over the willingness
of the monetary authorities to achieve the target. In
the following sections, we examine how policy-makers
have designed the elements of their IT frameworks
(some of which are summarized in Table 1, as they
currently exist) and adjusted them as they gained
experience to meet the dual criteria of credibility and
ﬂexibility.
The numerical target: points and ranges
The numerical target itself will inﬂuence the overall
credibility of the IT regime. Set it too high, and the
authorities may not be viewed as serious about achiev-
ing a low inﬂation environment. Too low, and the tar-
get may be viewed as unrealistic and have a reduced
impact on expectations. In practice, views on what is
realistic will vary over time as experience accumulates
and expectations adjust.
To reﬂect the impossibility (and undesirability) of con-
sistently maintaining inflation at a particular value,
some central banks have specified a target range
rather than a point target, or a range around the target.
Yet the interpretation of ranges can be problematic. Is
the objective to be within the band, or at its centre?
Are the bands simply indicative, or does movement
outside the range imply an aggressive monetary
New Zealand • The initial band of 0–2 per cent was widened to 0–3 per cent in • Various consumer price indexes were used to avoid incorpora-
1996 and changed to 1–3 per cent in 2002. ting the immediate price impacts of interest rate changes; a new
• The 2002 PTA indicated that outcomes would be evaluated “on total CPI introduced in 1999 largely removed these effects.
average over the medium term.” • The wording for speciﬁc caveats was broadened to reinforce
the idea that those cited were only some of a possible range
of shocks.
United Kingdom • The initial 1–4 per cent target range effectively became “2.5 per • The CPI excluding mortgage costs (RPIX) was replaced by
cent or less” in 1995, and then 2 1/2 per cent “at all times” in 1997. the European Union’s HICP in 2003, which excludes both
• In 1997, deviations of greater than 1 per cent were given special house prices and Council Tax (the new price series led to a
signiﬁcance, but not considered a “hard edge.” change in the target, from 2 1/2 to 2 per cent).
• The target became 2 per cent in 2003 to reﬂect a new target
price index.
Sweden • The initial target and target range have not been changed, but • At various times the central bank highlighted different price
beginning in 1999, a formal explanation was required if inﬂation indexes (e.g., that excluding mortgage-interest costs and
moved outside of the range. indirect taxes), and in 1999 clariﬁed that other price indexes
would be used as operational guides.
• In 2003, the bank highlighted a series that excluded energy as
an especially important guide.
Australia • The authorities have clariﬁed that the 2–3 per cent target • The original target was deﬁned as “underlying inﬂation,”
average means that inﬂation, when calculated over the cycle, although a speciﬁc measure was not identiﬁed; after 1998,
“would have a 2 in front of the decimal.” focused on a price measure that adjusted for housing costs.
Euro zone • The initial deﬁnition of price stability as “below 2 per cent” was • Targeted total CPI as defined by HICP—sometimes emphasizes
(European Central changed to “below, but close to, 2 per cent” in 2003. that energy prices have caused large movements, but otherwise
Bank) have made relatively little use of “core” indexes that exclude
certain components.
Norway • The intent to diminish the influence of temporary disturbances
was formalized with the development of a new operational
price index (published since 2001) that excludes energy and
indirect taxes.
Table 2
Selected Changes to IT Regimes (A)
Numerical target Target variable
Note: CPI = consumer price index, PTA = Policy Targets Agreement, HICP = harmonized index of consumer prices13 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2006
policy response, the so-called “hard edge”? In prac-
tice, IT central banks have tended to downplay any
automatic response implied by the edges of the
range (sometimes by giving them little emphasis).
The key changes that have been observed in the
numerical targets of IT regimes are summarized in the
ﬁrst column of Table 2. Inﬂation targeters have dem-
onstrated a clear preference for a target at or around
2 per cent. They have not lowered their inﬂation tar-
gets over time (aside from the use of indicative targets
during disinﬂationary periods at the beginning of IT
regimes), despite considerable success in controlling
inflation and improved monetary  policy credibility.10
This may be disappointing to those who believe that
additional gains can be had from further lowering
inflation. Note that some observers emphasize the
importance of maintaining a positive rate of inﬂation,
given their concerns over measurement bias and the
risk of deﬂation (in concert with the zero lower bound
on nominal interest rates).
Ranges are intended as
communication vehicles rather than
as “tripwires” for policy action.
Most central banks also employ a range, sometimes
without a midpoint. While generally intended to pro-
vide greater clarity as to the tolerance levels with
respect to the variance of inﬂation, the edges of the
rangesarenotregardedas“hard.”Transgressingthem
is not expected to induce a sudden break in policy
behaviour, designed to quickly bring inﬂation back to
the midpoint, but it is generally expected to bring
about detailed public explanations.
A further signal that ranges are intended as communi-
cation vehicles rather than as “tripwires” for policy
action is indicated by their nature. Rather than being
based on explicitly deﬁned conﬁdence intervals with
respect to inflation outcomes, ranges are generally given
in round numbers, typically plus or minus 1 per cent,
and are thus relatively easy to explain. Indeed, if viewed
primarily as a communication tool, the precise size of
the band may not be very important.
10. The reduction of the U.K. inﬂation target from 2 1/2 per cent to 2 per cent
in 2003 was the result of a technical change associated with the targeted price
index. See King (2004).
The target variable (and caveats)
Specifying a target begs the question of which prices
are to be targeted. The communications aspect of
inflation targeting argues in favour of highly visible
price indexes that are readily understood by the public.
Maintaining credibility also suggests that the choice of
price index should not appear manipulative, attempt-
ing to hide inconvenient realities.
But inﬂation targeting also raises the issue of how to
dealwithtransitoryinﬂationshocks.Pricemovements
that do not have medium-term implications for inﬂa-
tion should not typically affect monetary policy. Such
deviations may nevertheless strain credibility. Aside
from using ranges to explain their behaviour, authori-
ties may choose to focus on price indexes that explic-
itly exclude transitory effects. For example, they may
choose a measure of “domestic” inflation that excludes
the direct effects on inﬂation of changes in exchange
rates, or a measure of “core” inflation designed to
exclude a range of shocks that are likely to have a
transitory impact on inflation. In some cases, the
authorities may retain a broad price index (usually the
total consumer price index) as the overall objective,
but set policy according to a narrower price index,
i.e., an operational target that is felt to be more inform-
ative over the short term.
Central banks have, over time,
developed a more nuanced picture of
the different types of possible
transitory shocks.
Over time, a number of IT central banks have reﬁned
their target variable in an effort to “remove” the
impact of perceived temporary shocks (see the second
column of Table 2 for a summary of the key changes
that have been observed in the target variables). IT
authorities have been relatively conservative, however,
in the adjustments they make to price indexes, most
likely because of the potential measurement problems
that may be introduced as well as the implications for
communication. In general, central banks have opted
for broad series, generally excluding the direct effects
of interest rate changes and indirect taxes (and prefer-
ably produced by a separate statistical agency rather
than by the central bank itself, to minimize the potential
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Although central banks have, over time, developed a
more nuanced picture of the different types of possible
transitory shocks, they have tended to avoid highly
specialized indexes, again, most likely in the interests
of better communication. They have generally not, for
example, emphasized indexes that exclude the direct
effectsofchangestoexchangerates.Itisalsointeresting
that, despite the oft-repeated concerns regarding
measurement bias, there has not been a shift towards
indexes that might reduce this problem (e.g., chain-
linked price indexes). Again, these series may be viewed
as adding a degree of complexity (including the effects
of revisions to past data) that could make communica-
tion more difﬁcult.
The policy horizon
Transitory shocks can also be addressed by clarifying
the period over which inﬂation is expected to return to
its target. This period may be deﬁned by the monetary
policy lags, i.e., the horizon over which monetary policy
can inﬂuence inﬂation (sometimes referred to as the
control horizon). Alternatively, it may be defined as
the period over which it is desirable to bring inﬂation
back to the target (the policy, or targeting, horizon),
with the difference inﬂuenced by the relative weight
that the authorities place on other objectives (such as
the stabilization of output).
An IT central bank may deliberately adopt a policy
horizon longer than its control horizon. In general, a
medium-term horizon for achieving the inflation
objective suggests that other objectives are being
accorded at least some weight. It may not be a simple
task, however, for an outside observer to evaluate
these relative weights.
Important changes that have occurred in the policy
horizons of IT regimes are summarized in the first
column of Table 3. The tendency has been to some-
what lengthen the policy horizon for the achievement
of inﬂation targets, giving more attention in particular
to the medium term, despite the degree of ambiguity
such a choice may introduce. These revisions do not
appear to have resulted from changing views regarding
monetary policy lags, but may more accurately reﬂect
the authorities’ greater experience and increased
appreciation of the shocks that can occur. An impor-
tant motivating factor in some instances appears to be
New Zealand • The 2002 PTA placed considerable emphasis on the “medium • Joint PTAs with the government were a key mechanism
term.” introduced at the beginning of inﬂation targeting, although the
wording was altered over time to give increased clarity to the
central objective of price stability.
• The clause relating to the desire to avoid “unnecessary insta-
bility in output, interest rates and the exchange rate” added to
the 1999 PTA was not viewed as compromising the price-
stability objective.
United Kingdom • The inﬂation objective was originally set in terms of the length • The revisions to the Bank of England Act in 1998 included
of the current Parliament, but subsequent changes effectively operational independence for the central bank, as well as the
emphasized a medium-term focus. creation of a Monetary Policy Committee.
Sweden • The policy horizon has changed from 1–2 years to 2 years. • Increased government support for the central bank’s inﬂation-
• There has been a steady clariﬁcation of circumstances that targeting approach appeared in budget statements beginning
could lead to sustained deviations beyond the horizon. in 1996.
• A process providing for central bank warnings of the need to • Formal institutional independence was introduced for the
extend the policy horizon, if necessary, was introduced in 1999. central bank in 1999.
Australia • The horizon has always been put in the context of the medium • In 1996, the Governor and Treasurer released the Statement
term, but, beginning in 1996, it was further clariﬁed that on the Conduct of Monetary Policy, which indicated the
outcomes should be evaluated on the basis of “on average over government’s support for the inﬂation target and its
the cycle.” recognition of the independence of the Reserve Bank of
Australia (reiterated in the 2003 Statement).
Norway • In 2004, the initial two-year policy horizon for achieving the
target was subsequently changed to “a reasonable time horizon”
of “normally 1–3 years.”
Finland • The new Bank of Finland Act provided for independence of
the central bank, beginning in 1998.
Table 3
Selected Changes to IT Regimes (B)
Policy horizon Institutional structures
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the desire to allow for the impact of possible asset-
price bubbles.
Lengthening the explicit or implicit horizon does not
appear to have compromised credibility. Indeed, such
a shift may have been possible precisely because
credibility has increased. The public statements of IT
central banks may also shift among the control hori-
zon (determined by the monetary policy lags); the
inﬂation forecast horizon, in cases where the central
bank publishes an economic projection; and the policy
horizon over which deviations from the target are
expected to be fully eliminated.11 Although this might
represent a challenge for clarity of communication, it
does not appear to have harmed credibility.
Supporting institutional and policy
structures
It is widely recognized that appropriate institutional
and policy structures, particularly the clear support of
thegovernment,areimportantelementsofasuccessful,
credible IT regime. Such support has generally trans-
lated into increased independence for the central bank
and has included policy and communication initiatives
undertaken by the government. The evolution of insti-
tutional structures used to help establish the credibil-
ity of the IT regime in several representative instances
is described in the second column of Table 3.
A concern may exist, however, when objectives other
than inﬂation are raised. It is sometimes the case that
the relevant government statements or legislation also
make reference to apparently competing objectives,
such as employment or output growth. It appears,
however, that market participants have interpreted
such competing statements as indicating that the
monetary authorities will place some weight on output
stabilization, but not at the expense of significantly
undermining price stability.
Communication and the publication of
forecasts
Ranges, measures of underlying inflation, explicit
caveats, and policy horizons beyond the immediate
future are all methods for providing ﬂexibility in the
face of uncertainty and transitory shocks. Yet the same
flexibility may also threaten the credibility of the IT
regime, particularly where the monetary authorities
do not (and are perhaps unable to) reveal the weight
they are giving to other intermediate objectives
11.  The Sveriges Riksbank (Sweden’s central bank), in a recent clariﬁcation
(2006), noted that it had extended its forecast to three years, longer than the
two-year policy horizon, in part so that the effects of shocks persisting
beyond the policy horizon could be shown more easily.
(e.g., output stabilization or instrument stability). In
this situation, the supporting institutional structures
discussed above are critical. At least as important are
effective communications that publicly explain the
authorities’ decisions and behaviour.
Communications associated with policy frameworks
and objectives have increased enormously over the
past 15 years among IT and non-IT central banks
alike.12 As observed by Kuttner, “all inflation targeters
talk a great deal” (2004, 94). There is now a signiﬁcant
commonality in the approaches currently taken (with,
for example, detailed inﬂation reports almost univer-
sal). One area that continues to evolve signiﬁcantly,
however,isthepublicationofforward-lookingeconomic
information, including forecasts of inﬂation. Owing to
monetary policy lags, the IT framework places heavy
emphasis on inﬂation forecasts, so that policy-makers
are able to act in a timely fashion. Svensson (1999, 2005)
argues that, properly implemented, an inﬂation-tar-
geting approach is essentially an application of inﬂa-
tion-forecast targeting. Central banks have steadily
increased the amount of forward-looking information
that they publish, including, to an increasing degree,
their internal forecasts of inflation and other macro-
economic variables. Table 4 summarizes some of the
key features of the published inﬂation forecasts of IT
central banks.13
The central banks of both New Zealand and Norway
have moved markedly far with respect to forecast
disclosure. The publication of an interest rate path has
been a singularly problematic issue, in part because of
concernsthatitmaybeinterpretedasacommitment to a
particular path by the authorities, and because it is
difficult to convey the underlying uncertainty and
conditionality of the outlook. Nevertheless, the RBNZ
bases its forecast on an endogenous trajectory of inter-
est rates (i.e., rates that are not completely independent
but reﬂect what is happening in the other variables)
consistent with attaining the inflation target at its
chosen horizon. The Norwegian central bank had been
using the market term structure of interest rates
(adjusted when it has a significantly different view).
In late 2005, however, it started publishing its own
12.  See Issing (2005) and Berg (2005) for extensive tables comparing the com-
munication activities of all the central banks discussed here. See Poole (2005)
for a more detailed discussion of FOMC transparency.
13. See Berg (2005) for a similar comparison of central bank forecast reporting
across a somewhat different grouping of central banks (especially Table 3). In
Table 4, we focus on IT banks that report the interest rate assumption that was
used. Australia and Canada also publish inﬂation  forecasts.16 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2006
forecast for the interest rate for the following three
years.14
Central banks have steadily increased
the amount of forward-looking
information that they publish.
To summarize, communication is the glue that holds
the IT framework together. Given the ever-present
tension between the reality of a numerical target (or
range), and the impossibility of constantly achieving
it, communication tools such as inﬂation reports are
crucial to explaining the impact of temporary shocks.
The use of these tools has increased substantially in IT
countries.
It can be argued that clarity about the central bank’s
objectives is maximized when the inflation forecast
(and attendant uncertainty) is made public, so that
14.  The endogenous interest rate path is based on a set of six criteria that
deﬁne an appropriate and reasonable path (see the most recent Norges Bank
Inﬂation Report). The recent shift to an endogenous path for the policy rate has
reportedly progressed smoothly, although the differences to date between the
endogenous path and market-implied rates have been small (see Bergo 2006
and Qvigstad 2006).
private sector agents can assess central bank actions.
In effect, the forecast is a summary statistic for all of
the information variables upon which policy is set.
While there are different ways to obtain information
on the central bank’s objectives, forecasts may be a
particularly effective way of revealing underlying
preferences. They may also have drawbacks, however,
and an unresolved issue is the appropriate level of
detail to be included in published forecasts.
Conclusion
In some respects, inflation targeting in the industrialized
economies emerged in an ad hoc fashion. Economic
theory in the early 1990s did not provide a deﬁnitive
guide to the most suitable specification for an IT regime.
Nor was it clear what were the optimal conditions
under which to adopt an IT framework. Thus, the
early specification of IT frameworks, and the timing
of their introduction, included heavy doses of profes-
sional judgment, to some extent influenced by the
exigencies of the day.
From this perspective, it may seem surprising that
the original IT frameworks appear to have worked
extremely well. With frameworks that have typically
changed only modestly since their inception, all IT
countries have achieved low inﬂation and have sub-
stantially lowered inflation expectations. This may
suggest that, as long as a monetary authority can
New Zealand Endogenous Endogenous (with eventual Alternative scenarios are 3–4 years Yes
return to long-run average) described (in boxes in the
Report) as required.
United Kingdom Market-implied (also alter- An average between a Fan charts 2–3 years No
native scenario with a constant level and the path
constant interest rate) implied by UIP
Sweden Market-implied Adjustment to long-run Risk assessment includes fan 2–3 years No
equilibrium charts around the base (project some
scenario; also an alternative measures of resource
inﬂation scenario. utilization)
Euro zone1 Constant2 Constant All ﬁgures reported in ranges 2 years No
Switzerland Constant Constant Also report inﬂation 3 years No
tendencies based on money
indicators
Norway Endogenous Endogenous (but use a Fan charts; alternative 3–4 years Yes
conservative view of future scenarios; comparisons with
movements) monetary policy rules
Table 4
Selected Published Inﬂation Projections
Interest rate Exchange rate Conveying Approximate Projection for
assumption assumption uncertainty horizon output gap reported
Note: UIP = Uncovered interest parity
1. The projection reported is that of the European Central Bank staff. The Governing Council does not issue a separate projection.
2. Short-term interest rates are held constant, while long-term rates are based on market expectations.17 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2006
establish a credible commitment to low inﬂation, the
precise details of the IT framework are of comparatively
little importance. However, the details form part of a
broad communications package that is critical to the
establishment and maintenance of credibility, given
the ﬂexible application of inﬂation targeting followed
by all IT central banks.
It appears that central banks were able to arrive rea-
sonably quickly at a framework that was broadly right
for the existing environment. However, changes have
occurred over time in several key areas, most signiﬁ-
cantly in the policy horizon. It had tended to lengthen
somewhat, with greater emphasis on the medium term.
Greater emphasis has also been given to the kinds
of shocks and price movements to which the central
bank would either not respond or that would cause it
to allow sustained deviations from the target.
The design changes that have been adopted since IT
regimes were ﬁrst introduced were generally not the
result of perceived errors with the original specifica-
tion. Rather, it appears that, as credibility has been
established, IT central banks have been able to move
towards a more ﬂexible IT regime that is viewed as
more pragmatic, without concern about a loss of cred-
ibility. It has also allowed for a more nuanced
approach to addressing large but transitory shocks
within an IT framework. The remaining variations
among the IT frameworks of the relevant central
banks probably reflect different institutional reali-
ties and historical happenstance rather than strong
differences in views of the underlying economic the-
ory.
An important consideration underpinning the choice
of many of the elements of the framework has been
the ease with which they can be communicated to the
public, making it easier to explain the IT central bank’s
objectives and policy actions. The considerable effort
that central banks have put into public communication
initiatives and the improved understanding of the
IT framework that has emerged over time will likely
facilitate future design changes that the authorities
may wish to make. As discussed in Murray (2006), these
could include increased attention to large asset-price
movements, lower numerical targets, or price-level
targeting as opposed to the inﬂation targeting that is
now common.
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